{
  "schema_version": "1.1.0",
  "document": "security-primitives",
  "last_updated": "2026-05-31",
  "local_trust_posture_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/local-trust-posture.json",
  "claim_maturity_index": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/claim-maturity.json",
  "readiness_scope": "See claim-maturity.json readiness_scope. Not production-live or customer-ready.",
  "maturity_legend": ["WIRED", "AUTOMATED_TESTED", "E2E_VALIDATED", "NOT_E2E_VALIDATED", "BACKLOG", "NOT_CLAIMED"],
  "entries": [
    {
      "id": "PRIM-MTLS-AGENT-SAAS",
      "name": "Agent to SaaS mutual TLS",
      "claim_maturity": "NOT_E2E_VALIDATED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Passive eavesdropping on enforced mTLS segments"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["MITM where TLS absent", "Compromised clients", "All data-plane paths"],
      "validation_level": "Required in architecture; local-mock manifest proof; sandbox CI gates",
      "current_limitation": "Not e2e-validated on every route or environment",
      "next_validation": "Sandbox e2e agent sync with gate artifact",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/security-capability-validation.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "mTLS is wired and mock-validated on documented agent routes — not production-live everywhere."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-HMAC-AGENT-SAAS",
      "name": "Agent to SaaS HMAC",
      "claim_maturity": "AUTOMATED_TESTED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Unsigned agent calls on HMAC-enforced routes"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Replay outside dedup", "Stolen keys", "Exactly-once delivery"],
      "validation_level": "Middleware wired; automated crypto unit tests",
      "current_limitation": "Agent-route scope only",
      "next_validation": "Sandbox e2e with key rotation",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/security-capability-validation.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "HMAC verifies agent context where enforced — not replay-proof delivery."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-PROVIDER-SIGNATURE",
      "name": "Provider webhook signatures",
      "claim_maturity": "AUTOMATED_TESTED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Forged Stripe-class payloads on configured wedge paths in mock scope"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Unconfigured providers", "Production-live attestation for all sources"],
      "validation_level": "Wedge claim map PROVEN local_mock for Stripe signature path",
      "current_limitation": "Mock/sandbox scope per wedge limitations",
      "next_validation": "Public sandbox e2e with negative signature case",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/evidence/v1/wedge-claim-map.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Provider signatures are evidenced for configured wedge sources — not all adapters."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-CONSTANT-TIME-SIG-COMPARE",
      "name": "Constant-time signature comparison",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Timing leaks on unreviewed paths"],
      "validation_level": "Unit tests on shared compare helpers; not mapped to every ingress",
      "current_limitation": "Design intent — not global certification",
      "next_validation": "Per-adapter security regression checklist",
      "public_evidence_ref": null,
      "public_safe_summary": "Constant-time compare is wired where used — not claimed on every path."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-SPIFFE-SPIRE",
      "name": "SPIFFE/SPIRE workload identity (see PRIM-SPIFFE-SPIRE-NATIVE-INTERNAL)",
      "claim_maturity": "NOT_E2E_VALIDATED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Impersonation on SPIFFE-verified connections"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Customer-operated SPIRE in V1", "Authz decisions", "SVID rotation proof", "24h survival"],
      "validation_level": "Zen-managed internal identity in V1 — not customer SPIRE ops",
      "current_limitation": "Partial coverage — see native-internal primitive",
      "next_validation": "Published rotation drill in demo scope",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/local-trust-posture.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "SPIFFE/SPIRE-native identity is Zen-managed in V1 — customers do not operate SPIRE."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-ZEN-LOCAL-TRUST-AUTHORITY",
      "name": "zen-agent local trust authority facade",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": ["Enrollment and flow sync issues via agent health"],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Compromised cluster admin", "24h validated SaaS independence", "Customer SPIRE ops"],
      "validation_level": "Contract-defined local supervisor for trust material projection",
      "current_limitation": "Architecture WIRED — not 24h-validated",
      "next_validation": "Outage simulation with public-safe receipt",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/local-trust-posture.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "zen-agent is the visible customer-plane local authority — not proof of multi-day survival."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-ZEN-LOCK-SURVIVAL-STORE",
      "name": "ZenLock survival store for encrypted local material",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Plaintext-at-rest on configured zen-lock survival paths"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Memory exposure", "All secrets", "24h survival", "ZenLock rotates all credentials"],
      "validation_level": "zen-lock encrypts and projects local survival material",
      "current_limitation": "Custody scope — not universal coverage",
      "next_validation": "Redacted rotation drill publication",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/credential-lifecycle-ownership.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "zen-lock holds encrypted local survival material — rotation owned by per-type lifecycles."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-KEY-MATERIAL-ROTATION",
      "name": "Key and certificate material rotation",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Some expiry outages via cert-manager and HMAC controllers"],
      "helps_detect": ["Rotation failures where metrics exist"],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Zero-downtime everywhere", "24h survival without refresh"],
      "validation_level": "Per-type rotation owners — see credential-lifecycle-ownership",
      "current_limitation": "Not one universal rotation engine",
      "next_validation": "Sandbox rotation gate with manifest link",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/credential-lifecycle-ownership.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Rotation reduces expiry risk — not validated 24h survival or compliance certification."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-AIR-GAPPED-ADAPTER-HANDOFF",
      "name": "Air-gapped adapter material handoff",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["SaaS on every bootstrap", "Air-gap compliance certification"],
      "validation_level": "Contract-defined offline bundle import",
      "current_limitation": "Operator-mediated — not customer SPIRE UI",
      "next_validation": "Verifier tooling with public capability ref only",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/local-trust-posture.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Offline handoff path exists in architecture — not validated production air-gap program."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-SPIFFE-SPIRE-NATIVE-INTERNAL",
      "name": "Zen-managed SPIFFE/SPIRE-native internal identity",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Impersonation on SPIFFE-verified mTLS hops"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Customer SPIRE in V1", "SPIRE everywhere", "Customer-exposed SPIRE admin", "SVID rotation proof"],
      "validation_level": "Internal Zen-managed — customers do not operate SPIRE in V1",
      "current_limitation": "Public customer SPIRE controls are NOT_CLAIMED for V1",
      "next_validation": "Demo rotation receipt without customer SPIRE wording",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/security-capability-validation.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "SPIFFE/SPIRE-native identity is internal and Zen-managed — not customer-operated in V1."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-LOCAL-MATERIAL-EXPIRY-FAIL-CLOSED",
      "name": "Local material expiry fail-closed",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Silent use of expired material on enforced paths"],
      "helps_detect": ["Rejections when certs/keys expired"],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Unenforced paths", "Stolen valid material", "24h survival"],
      "validation_level": "Fail-closed on enforced paths — per-environment proof incomplete",
      "current_limitation": "Not e2e-validated on every path",
      "next_validation": "Published negative expiry test",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/local-trust-posture.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Expired local material fails closed where enforced — not optional downgrade."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-ZENLOCK-SECRETS",
      "name": "ZenLock secret custody",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Plaintext-at-rest on configured ZenLock paths"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Memory exposure", "Universal secret coverage"],
      "validation_level": "Documented custody model",
      "current_limitation": "Scope-limited enrollment/signing flows",
      "next_validation": "Rotation drill without leaking material in public artifacts",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/credential-lifecycle-ownership.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "ZenLock encrypts configured secrets at rest — not all secrets or zero-knowledge."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-RLS-TENANT",
      "name": "PostgreSQL row-level security",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Some cross-tenant SQL on RLS tables"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["App-layer bugs", "Cache/log leakage", "Isolation certification"],
      "validation_level": "Schema RLS policies; no public fuzz e2e",
      "current_limitation": "Defense-in-depth only",
      "next_validation": "Automated cross-tenant negative tests",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/evidence/v1/manifest.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "RLS helps on covered tables — not enterprise isolation proof."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-HASH-CHAIN-EVIDENCE",
      "name": "Hash-chain evidence integrity",
      "claim_maturity": "AUTOMATED_TESTED",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": ["Tampering of included evidence artifacts vs published integrity roots"],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Authentication", "Identity", "Encryption", "Replay prevention", "Delivery guarantees"],
      "validation_level": "Automated integrity gates on evidence packs",
      "current_limitation": "Integrity for evidence bundles only",
      "next_validation": null,
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/evidence/v1/manifest.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Hash-chain is tamper-evidence for artifacts — not auth, identity, encryption, or replay control."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-IDEMPOTENCY-DEDUP",
      "name": "Idempotency and duplicate detection",
      "claim_maturity": "AUTOMATED_TESTED",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": ["Duplicate delivery within idempotency window in mock scenarios"],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Exactly-once", "Replay outside window", "Replay-proof platform"],
      "validation_level": "Manifest victory_locked duplicate-idempotency; mock execution category",
      "current_limitation": "At-least-once with dedup — not replay prevention",
      "next_validation": "Sandbox e2e duplicate-event receipt",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/evidence/v1/manifest.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Idempotency reduces duplicate processing in tested scenarios — not replay-proof."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-OUTBOUND-ONLY-EDGE",
      "name": "Outbound-only edge connectivity",
      "claim_maturity": "WIRED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Inbound listener requirement for wedge private-network pattern"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Wrong-target egress", "SaaS SSRF", "Compromised edge"],
      "validation_level": "Architecture structural property",
      "current_limitation": "Topology benefit — not universal guarantee",
      "next_validation": null,
      "public_evidence_ref": null,
      "public_safe_summary": "Outbound-only edge is a structural wedge property — not full delivery security."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-CANARY-CERT-ROTATION",
      "name": "Canary TLS certificate rotation",
      "claim_maturity": "NOT_E2E_VALIDATED",
      "helps_prevent": ["Some big-bang cert cutovers on canary-enabled workloads"],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Failed rotation on all workloads"],
      "validation_level": "cert-manager renewal; partial canary evidence",
      "current_limitation": "Not all workloads covered",
      "next_validation": "E2e canary gate for egress parity",
      "public_evidence_ref": "https://docs.zen-mesh.io/ai/security/v1/security-capability-validation.json",
      "public_safe_summary": "Canary rotation is partial by workload — not production-live everywhere."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-SSRF-SAAS-DISPATCH",
      "name": "SSRF controls for SaaS dispatch",
      "claim_maturity": "BACKLOG",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["SSRF", "Redirect bypass"],
      "validation_level": "Webhook-security gates only — not SSRF contract",
      "current_limitation": "Not SSRF-protected",
      "next_validation": "WH-AS-001 negative SSRF suite",
      "public_evidence_ref": null,
      "roadmap_ref": "WH-AS-001",
      "public_safe_summary": "SSRF hardening is backlog — gates do not justify SSRF-safe wording."
    },
    {
      "id": "PRIM-PAYLOAD-POINTER",
      "name": "Large payload pointer model",
      "claim_maturity": "BACKLOG",
      "helps_prevent": [],
      "helps_detect": [],
      "does_not_prevent": ["Large-body DoS"],
      "validation_level": "Not implemented",
      "current_limitation": "Ad hoc inline limits only",
      "next_validation": "Signed object-reference contract",
      "public_evidence_ref": null,
      "roadmap_ref": "WH-AS-003",
      "public_safe_summary": "Large payload pointer model is not shipped."
    }
  ]
}